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Abstract. XTR public key system was introduced at Crypto 2000, which
is based on a method to present elements of a subgroup of a multiplicative
group of a finite field. Its application in cryptographic protocols leads to sub-
stantial savings both in communication and computational overhead without
compromising security. It was shown how the use of finite extension fields
and subgroups can be combined in such a way that the number of bits to be
exchanged is reduced by a factor 3.
In this paper we show how to more compress the communication overhead.
The compressed XTR leads to a factor 6 reduction in the representation size
compared to the traditional representation and achieves as twice compactness
as XTR. The computational overhead of it is a little worse than that of XTR,
however the compressed XTR requires only about additional 6% computa-
tional effort. If finding 4-th roots of unity is pre-computed, then the compu-
tational overhead is only 1% compared to that of original XTR. Furthermore,
the required size of public key data of it reduces about 26% from that of XTR.
1 Introduction
In the classical Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange scheme, two system parameters are
fixed: a large prime number q and a generator g of the multiplicative group of the basic
prime field Fq. In the basic DH scheme the two parties each send a random power
of g to the other party. Assuming both parties know q and g, each party transmits
about log2(q) bits to the other party.
In [4], ElGamal suggested that finite extension fields can be used instead of prime
fields, but no direct computational or communication advantages where implied. In
[10], Schnorr proposed a variant of the classical Diffie-Hellman scheme, in which g does
not generate the whole multiplicative group of the prime field Fq, but only a small
subgroup of which the order contain relatively small compared to q. This considerably
reduces the computational cost of the DH scheme, but has no effect on the number
of bits to be exchanged.
After that, it has tried to make use of traces to represent and calculate powers
of elements of a subgroup of a finite field to achieve efficient and compact subgroup
representation. The LUC cryptosystem uses the trace over Fq to represent elements
of the order q + 1 subgroup of F∗q2 [12]. Compared to the traditional representation
LUC leads to a a factor 2 reduction in the representation size. The variant described
in [5] uses the subgroup of order q2 + q + 1 of F∗q3 instead, but as a result sizes are
reduced by only a factor 1.5. In [2], Brouwer et al. introduced for the first time how
the use of finite extension fields and subgroups can be combined in such a way that
the number of bits to be exchanged is reduced by a factor 3. More specifically, it was
shown that elements of an order p subgroup of F∗q6 can be represented using 2 log2(q)
bits if p divides q2 − q + 1. Despite its communication efficiency, the method of it is
rather troublesome and computationally not particularly efficient.
In 2000 Lenstra-Verheul introduced XTR [7], a cryptosystem using the trace over
Fq2 to represent elements of the order q2 − q + 1 subgroup of F∗q6 , there by achiev-
ing a factor 3 size reduction. Also, the resulting calculations are appreciably faster
than using the standard representation. XTR of security equivalent to 1024-bit RSA
achieves speed comparable to cryptosystems based on random elliptic curves over
random prime fields (ECC) of equivalent security. The corresponding XTR public
keys are only about twice as large as ECC keys, assuming global system parame-
ters - without the last requirement the sizes of XTR and ECC public keys are the
same. Furthermore, parameter initialization from scratch for XTR takes a negligible
amount of computing time, unlike RSA and ECC. Combined with its very easy pro-
grammability, this makes XTR an excellent public key system for a very wide variety
of environments, ranging from smart cards to web servers.
In this paper we present a greatly improved version of XTR that leads to a factor 6
reduction in the representation size compared to the traditional representation. That
is to say, we achieve a factor 2 reduction compared to the original XTR. We show
that if the characteristic of q is three, i.e. q = 32k−1 for some integer k, then we can
use the trace over Fq to represent elements of the order q−
√
3q+1 subgroup of F∗q6 .
Also, the resulting calculations such as exponentiations are as faster as that of XTR.
Given Tr(q6,q)(g) and n, Tr(q6,q)(gn) takes about 1381 multiplications in Fq, which
is only about 6% increase compared to the cost of computation of Tr(q6,q2)(hn) for
given Tr(q6,q2)(h) and n, where the size of n is 160 bits. If q is fixed, then finding
square root of −1 can be pre-computed. In this case, the computational overhead is
only 1% compared to that of original XTR. Furthermore, the required size of public
key data of it reduces about 26% from that of the original XTR.
In Section 2 we describe XTR, and in Section 3 we introduce XTR over character-
istic three, which achieves a factor 2 reduction in the representation size compared to
XTR. Section 4 shows efficient calculations of XTR exponentiation over characteristic
three. Applications and comparisons to the original XTR are given in Section 5.
2 XTR
2.1 Description of XTR
XTR uses a subgroup of prime order p of the order q2 − q + 1 subgroup of F∗q6 . The
latter group is referred to as the XTR supergroup denoted as Gq2−q+1 and the order
p subgroup Gp is referred to as the XTR group. The XTR supergroup Gq2−q+1 is not
contained in any proper subfield of Fq6 due to the following fact.
Fact 1 [8] Let p be a prime factor of Φm(q), where m-th cyclotomic polynomial for
a positive integer m not divisible by q. Then the subgroup Gp of F∗qm is not contained
in any proper subfield of Fqm .
Combined with the choice of p it follows that computing discrete logarithms in Gp
is as hard, in general, as it is in F∗q6 [7].
Before describing XTR more detail, we introduce two definitions about optimal
normal basis.
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Definition 1. Type I Optimal Normal Basis (Type-I ONB)
If m+1 is a prime and q is a generator of F ∗m+1, then the set {ωm, ωm−1, · · · , ω2,
ω} forms an optimal normal basis of type I in Fqm and called Type-I ONB. Here, ω
is the primitive (m+1)-th root of unity.
Definition 2. Type II Optimal Normal Basis (Type-II ONB)
If 2m+ 1 is a prime and either of the following two conditions holds,
• q is a primitive root module 2m+ 1,
• q is a quadratic residue module 2m+ 1 and q 6≡ 1 mod (2m+ 1),
then the set {βm, βm−1, · · · , β2, β} forms an optimal normal basis of type II in Fqm
and called Type-II ONB. Here, β = γ + γ−1 and γ is the primitive (2m+1)-th root of
unity.
XTR uses Fq2 arithmetic to achieve Fq6 security, without requiring explicit con-
struction of Fq6 . Let q be a prime that is 2 mod 3. It follows that (X3− 1)/(X − 1) =
X2 +X + 1 is irreducible over Fq and the zeros α and αq of it form an Type-I ONB
for Fq2 over Fq. In XTR elements of Gp are represented by their trace over Fq2 . For
h ∈ F∗q6 the trace Tr(q6,q2)(h) over Fq2 is defined as the sum of the conjugates over
Fq2 of h, i.e. Tr(q6,q2)(h) = h+hq
2
+hq
4 ∈ Fq2 . Let p and q be primes with p dividing
q2 − q + 1. Also let h be a generate of Gp and let c = Tr(q6,q2)(h). Suggested lengths
to provide adequate levels of security are log2(q) ≈ 170 and log2(p) ≈ 160.
cn denotes Tr(q6,q2)(hn) ∈ Fq2 , for some q and h of order p dividing q2 − q + 1 as
above. Efficient computation of cn given q, p and c depends on the recurrence relation
cu+v = cucv − cqvcu−v + cu−2v, (1)
for u, v ∈ Z. It simplifies for u = v to
c2u = c2u − 2cqu. (2)
In [7], Lenstra and Verheul proved that computing cu+v and c2u take four and two
multiplications in Fq respectively, when cu, cv, cu−v, and cu−2v are given.
2.2 XTR Exponentiation
In XTR, an algorithm for computing Tr(q6,q2)(hn) given Tr(q6,q2)(h) and a scalar
n ∈ Z is needed like the algorithm for computing hn in public key system based
on discrete logarithm problem. By using two formula (1),(2) above, we define the
following two functions called as XTR addition and XTR doubling respectively;
A[u, v, w, z] = u · v − vq · w + z,
D[u] = u2 − 2uq.
Theorem 1. ([7], Theorem 2.3.8) Let c and a positive integer n be given. Computing
the sum cn of the nth powers of the roots takes 8 log2(n) multiplications in Fq.
Thus, given the representation Tr(q6,q2)(h) ∈ Fq2 of the conjugates of h, the repre-
sentation Tr(q6,q2)(hn) ∈ Fq2 of the conjugates of the nth power of h can be computed
at the cost of 8 log2(n) multiplications in Fq, for any integer n.
Denote the above XTR exponentiation with input c and n outputs cn as
XTR Exp[c, n] = cn.
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XTR Exponentiation ([7], Algorithm 2.3.7)
INPUT: c and n where n > 2
OUTPUT: cn
1. Compute initial values:
1.1. C3 ← c, C0 ← D[C3], C1 ← A[C0, C3, C3, 3], and C2 ← D[C0]
1.2. If n is even, n replace n− 1.
Let n = 2m+ 1 and m =
∑l
j=0mj2
j with mj ∈ {0, 1} and ml = 1.
2. for j = l− 1 down to 0
2.1. T1 ← D[Cmj ]
2.2. T2 ← D[C1+mj ]
2.3. if (mj = 0) then T3 ← A[C0, C1, Cq3 , Cq2 ]
if (mj = 1) then T3 ← A[C2, C1, C3, Cq0 ]
2.4. C0 ← T1
2.5. C1 ← T3
2.6. C2 ← T2
3. If n is odd then return C1
else return C2
2.3 XTR-DH Key Agreement
XTR can be used in any cryptosystem that relies on the discrete logarithm problem.
This section contains a description of an application of XTR that provides confiden-
tiality service, for example Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
Public Parameters : q, p, c = Tr(q6,q2)(h)
If Alice and Bob want to agree on a secret key K they do the following.
1. Alice selects at random a ∈ Zp, uses XTR Exp[c, a] = ca ∈ Fq2 , and sends ca to
Bob.
2. Bob receives ca from Alice, selects at random b ∈ Zp, uses XTR Exp[c, b] = cb ∈
Fq2 , and sends cb to Alice.
3. Alice receives cb from Bob, computes XTR Exp[cb, a] = cba, and determines K
based on cba := Tr(q6,q2)(hba).
4. Bob uses XTR Exp[ca, b] = cab, and determines K based on cab := Tr(q6,q2)(hab).
3 XTR over Characteristic Three
The original XTR uses the trace over Fq2 to represent elements of the order q2− q+1
subgroup of F∗q6 , thereby achieving a factor 3 size reduction. This section shows that
if q is 3 to the odd power then elements in Gq2−q+1 can be represented as elements
in Fq using the trace over Fq. It achieves a factor 6 size reduction, which is the half
size reduction compared to the original XTR representation.
3.1 New XTR Group
We assume that q = 3t for any odd integer t, say t = 2k − 1. Then, √3q = 3k is an
integer and q2 − q + 1 is factorized as
q2 − q + 1 = (q +
√
3q + 1)(q −
√
3q + 1).
In this section, we define a new XTR group Gp =< g > which is a subgroup of
Gq−√3q+1, namely, XTR uses a subgroup of prime order p of the order q −
√
3q + 1
subgroup of F∗q6 . The order p subgroup < g > generated by g is referred as the New
XTR group. Since p does not divide any qs− 1 for s = 1, 2, 3, the new XTR group Gp
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generated by g cannot be embedded in the multiplicative group of any true subfield
of Fq6 . Combined with the choice of p it follows that computing discrete logarithms
in Gp is as hard, in general, as it is in F∗q6 (cf. [7], Section 5).
Gp =< g > C Gq−√3q+1 C Gq2−q+1 C Gq3−1 (3)
Here, ACB denotes A is a subgroup of B.
From q = 3t and t is odd it follows q is a generator of F∗5, so that {ω + ω−1, ω2 +
ω−2} form an Type-II ONB for Fq2 over Fq, where ω is a root of the polynomial
(X5 − 1)/(X − 1) = X4 + X3 + X2 + X + 1. For the simplicity, we denote x =
x1 · (ω + ω−1) + x2 · (ω2 + ω−2) ∈ Fq2 as (x1, x2).
Lemma 1. Let x, y, z ∈ Fq2 with q = 3t and t is odd.
i. Computing xq is for free.
ii. Computing x2 takes two multiplications in Fq.
iii. Computing x ∗ z − y ∗ zq takes four multiplications in Fq.
Proof. Let x = (x1, x2), y = (y1, y2) and z = (z1, z2) ∈ Fq2 for xi, yi, zi ∈ Fq,
i ∈ {1, 2}. From (ω+ω−1)q = ω2+ω−2 and (ω2+ω−2)q = ω+ω−1, xq = (x2, x1). It
follows that qth powering in Fq2 does not require arithmetic operations and can thus
be considered to be for free.
From x2 =
(
(x1+x2)(x1−x2)+2x1x2, 2(x1+x2)(x1−x2)+2x1x2
)
, x2 is obtained
from two multiplications in Fq.
Finally, to compute x ∗ z − y ∗ zq four multiplications in Fq suffice, because it is
easily verified that
x ∗ z − y ∗ zq = ((x2 − 2x1 + y2 − y1) ∗ z1 + (x1 − x2 + 2y1 − y2) ∗ z2) ∗ (ω + ω−1)
+
(
(x2 − x1 + 2y2 − y1) ∗ z1 + (x1 − 2x2 + y1 − y2) ∗ z2
) ∗ (ω2 + ω−2).
uunionsq
3.2 Compression and Restoration
For some q and g of order p dividing q−√3q+1, define d and e as the trace Tr(q6,q2)(g)
over Fq2 and the trace Tr(q6,q)(g) over Fq, respectively. We use the shorthand dn =
Tr(q6,q2)(gn) and en = Tr(q6,q)(gn), i.e. en and dn are the sum of the conjugates over
Fq2 and Fq of gn respectively. Immediately, d = d1 and e = e1.
dn = Tr(q6,q2)(gn) = gn + gnq
2
+ gnq
4 ∈ Fq2
en = Tr(q6,q)(gn) = gn + gnq + gnq
2
+ gnq
3
+ gnq
4
+ gnq
5 ∈ Fq.
Compression From the definition of dn and en, en can be easily derived from dn
due to the following equation
en = dn + dqn. (4)
For any dn = x(ω + ω−1) + y(ω2 + ω−2) ∈ Fq2 , we have that en = (x + y) ∗ (ω +
ω−1) + (x + y) ∗ (ω2 + ω−2) ∈ Fq because of Lemma 1-i. Note that as dn ∈ Fq2 and
dn /∈ Fq, x 6= y.
Define a compression function with input an element of Fq2 represented by two
elements of Fq, say (x, y), outputs an element of Fq.
Compression[x, y]= x+ y
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Restoration Contrary to the compression from dn to en, this section explains how
to get dn from en, called it as restoration in this paper.
Lemma 2. The roots of X2 − enX + e
√
3q
n ∈ Fq[x] are dn and dqn.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove dn ∗ dqn = e
√
3q
n because dn + dqn = en from equation
(4). For simplicity, we prove dn ∗ dqn = e
√
3q
n when n = 1.
d ∗ dq = (g + gq2 + gq4) · (gq + gq3 + gq5)
= g1+q + g1+q
3
+ g1+q
5
+ gq
2+q + gq
2+q3 + gq
2+q5 + gq
4+q + gq
4+q3 + gq
4+q5
X= g
√
3q + (gq)
√
3q + (gq
2
)
√
3q + (gq
3
)
√
3q + (gq
4
)
√
3q + (gq
5
)
√
3q + 3
= (g+gq+gq
2
+gq
3
+gq
4
+gq
5
)
√
3q
= e
√
3q.
The third equality is derived from the series of subgroups in equation (3), that is to
say, gq+1 = g
√
3q (from <g> C Gq−√3q+1) and gq
3+1 = 1 (from <g> C Gq3−1). uunionsq
From Lemma 2, we can find two roots dn and dqn by solving the quadratic formula,
which are
{dn, dqn} =
en ±
√
e2n − 4e
√
3q
n
2
. (5)
Let en = z ∈ Fq and the roots of the quadratic equation be {(x, y), (y, x)}, where
x, y ∈ Fq and x 6= y. Actually, z = x+ y. Define a restoration function with input en,
outputs {dn, dqn} ∈ Fq2 .
Restoration[en]= {dn, dqn}.
4 Efficient Method of Restoration - finding dn and d
q
n from en
As we have looked around at the previous section, we need to solve the quadratic
formula described in Lemma 2 to extract dn and dqn from en. In other words, we have
to compute the square root extraction
√
e2n − 4e
√
3q
n .
In a finite field Frs where r ≡ 3 (mod 4) and odd s, the best algorithm known [3, 9]
to compute a squire root executes O(s log2 r) multiplications in Frs . By that method,
a solution of X2 = A is given by X = A
rs+1
4 , assume that A is a quadratic residue.
Recently, Barreto et al. (c.f. [1], Section 4) presented an improvement to it. The
complexity is reduced to O(log2 s+log2 r) multiplications in Frs . If the characteristic
r is fixed and small compared to s, the complexity is simply O(log2 s).
4.1 Square Root Extraction
Let R = e2n − 4e
√
3q
n ∈ Fq. Here, q = 32k−1 for any inter k. As dn or dqn /∈ Fq
√
R
is not an element of Fq. Thus, we can not utilize Barreto et al.’s method directly to
compute square root of R even if q ≡ 3 (mod 4).
Fact 2 −1 has a square root in Fq if and only if q ≡ 1 (mod 4).
As q ≡ 3 (mod 4), √−1 /∈ Fq, but in Fq2 .
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Lemma 3.
√−R ∈ Fq, where −R = 2e2n + e
√
3q
n .
Proof. Let F ∗q = 〈g1〉.
√
gn1 = g
n/2
1 ∈ Fq if n is even and
√
gn1 is not in Fq if n is odd
for gn1 ∈ F ∗q . From (g(q−1)/21 )2 = 1 and g1 is a generator of Fq, g(q−1)/21 = −1. We
confirm easily that (q − 1)/2 is odd if q = 32k−1. Then we see that R = gn11 for some
odd n1 since
√
R 6∈ Fq. Hence −R = R · (−1) = gn1+(q−1)/21 and n1 + (q − 1)/2 is
even. Therefore,
√−R ∈ Fq. uunionsq
From Lemma 3, one of
√−R is (−R) q+14 and it is efficiently computed by using the
idea of Barreto et al. [1]. The basic idea is as follows.
They noticed that, if q = 32k−1 for some k:
q + 1
4
=
32k−1 + 1
4
= 6 ·
k−2∑
i=0
(32)i + 1,
so that (−R)(q+1)/4 = [((−R)2)∑k−2i=0 (32)i]3 · (−R).
The quantity
(
(−R)2)∑k−2i=0 (32)i is efficiently computed in an analogues fash-
ion to Itoh-Teechai-Tsujii inversion [6], based on the Frobenius map in character-
istic three. Let A ∈ Fq. Then, one can compute A
∑k−2
i=0 (3
2)i with no more than
blog2(k−1)c + HW (k−1) − 1 multiplications in Fq. Here, b·cand HW (·) denote the
maximum integer less than its operand and the Hamming weight of its operand re-
spectively. Thus, we need at most blog2(k−1)c+HW (k−1) + 1 multiplications in Fq
to compute (−R)(q+1)/4 in total.
Next we must find
√−1 ∈ Fq2 to compute
√
R =
√−R·√−1. 4-th roots of unity in
Fq2 are ±1, ±
√−1. We select an element x in F ∗q2 at random then x(q
2−1)/4 becomes
any of ±1,±√−1. If x(q2−1)/4 is not ±1 then it is one of square root of −1. 4-th roots
of unity are also efficiently computed just by small modification of Barreto et al.’s
idea [1].
q2 − 1
4
=
34k−2 − 1
4
= 2 ·
2k−2∑
i=0
(32)i,
so that (
x
)(q2−1)/4 = (x2)∑2k−2i=0 (32)i .
As x ∈ Fq2 , to find a 4-th root of unity it takes on average 2 ·
(blog2(2k−1)c +
HW (2k−1)) multiplications in Fq2 using the Frobenius map in characteristic three.
Thus, 6 · (blog2(2k−1)c+HW (2k−1)) multiplications in Fq as one multiplication in
Fq2 takes three1 multiplications in Fq. Note that if q is fixed, then finding square root
of −1 can be pre-computed.
1 Multiplication in Fq2 can be done using four multiplications in Fq. These straightfor-
ward results can simply be improved to three multiplications by using a Karatsuba-like
approach: to compute (x1, x2)∗(y1, y2) one computes x1∗y1, x2∗y2, and (x1+x2)∗(y1+y2),
then (x1, x2)∗(y1, y2) becomes
(
(x1+x2)∗(y1+y2)+x2 ∗y2, (x1+x2)∗(y1+y2)+x1 ∗y1
)
.
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4.2 Computation of dn and dqn
Thanks to the equation (5) and the results of the previous section, for given en ∈ Fq
{dn, dqn} =
en ±
√
R
2
= 2 · (en ±
√−R · √−1)
= 2en ± (2e2n + e
√
3q
n )
q+1
4 · √−1. (6)
Table 1 shows the number of multiplications in Fq required to compute equation
(6), where as customary we do not count the cost of additions and subtractions in Fq.
Table 1. The number of multiplications in Fq for computation of dn and dqn, where q = 3t
and t = 2k − 1 for some integer k
Operation # of multiplications in Fq
e2n 1
e
√
3q
n free if Fq has Type-II ONB over F3
(2e2n + e
√
3q
n )
q+1
4 blog2(k−1)c+HW (k−1) + 1√−1 6 · (blog2(2k−1)c+HW (2k−1))
(2e2n + e
√
3q
n )
q+1
4 · √−1 2
2en ± (2e2n + e
√
3q
n )
q+1
4 · √−1 6 · (blog2(2k−1)c+HW (2k−1))+
blog2(k−1)c+HW (k−1) + 4
For efficient computation of
√
3q-th power of en (∈ Fq), i.e. e
√
3q
n , we should select
q such that Fq has optimal normal basis (ONB) over F3. As q = 32k−1,
√
3q = 3k.
Thus,
√
3q-th power is performed by shift of coefficients when Fq has ONB over F3.
However, Fq never has Type-I ONB over F3 since 2k is not prime. Therefore, we
should check whether Fq has Type-II ONB over F3 or not for given k. For example,
we may select k = 55, 70, 82, 89, and 94, which satisfy that Fq has Type-II ONB over
F3.
Note that a multiplication (2e2n + e
√
3q
n )
q+1
4 ∗ √−1 takes two multiplications in Fq
because (2e2n + e
√
3q
n )
q+1
4 ∈ Fq and
√−1 ∈ Fq2 .
Theorem 2. Given en for any integer n, computing dn and dqn take about 6 ·(blog2(2k−1)c + HW (2k−1)) + blog2(k−1)c + HW (k−1) + 4 multiplications in Fq
under assumption that Fq has Type-II ONB over F3.
5 Compressed XTR Exponentiation
In this section it is shown how en can be computed based on e1 and an arbitrary
integer n.
Restoration - compute d1 and d
q
1 from Restoration[e1]. Between {d1, dq1} choose one
of them at random, denoted d′.
XTR exponentiation - compute d′n from XTR Exp[d
′, n] described in section 2.2.
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Compression - compute Compression[d′n] = d
′
n+(d
′
n)
q. Actually, Compression[d′n] =
en.
At the compression step, we can easily check d′n+(d
′
n)
q = en. d′ is one of {d1, dq1}.
If d′ = d1 then it is trivial because of the definition of en. Otherwise, i.e. d′ = d
q
1
then d′n + (d
′
n)
q = dqn + dn because dn ∈ Fq2 , which concludes the justification of the
compression step.
Denote the above XTR exponentiation over characteristic three with input e1 and
n outputs en as
XTR Exp3[e1, n] = en.
Theorem 3. Let e1 and a positive integer n ∈ Zp be given. Assume that Fq has
Type-II ONB over F3. Then, computing en takes about 8 log2(n)+6 ·
(blog2(2k−1)c+
HW (2k−1))+ blog2(k−1)c+HW (k−1) + 4 multiplications in Fq.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 2, XTR Exponentiation algorithm ([7], Algorithm
2.3.7), and Lemma 1.
5.1 Application to XTR-DH
In this section we describe XTR version Diffie-Hellman key agreement over charac-
teristic three.
Public Parameters : q(= 32k−1), p, Tr(q6,q)(g) := e
Suppose that Alice and Bob who both have access to the XTR public key data,
want to agree on a shared secret key K. This can be done using the following XTR
version.
1. Alice selects at random a ∈ Zp, uses XTR Exp3[e, a] = ea ∈ Fq, and sends ea to
Bob.
2. Bob receives ea from Alice, selects at random b ∈ Zp, uses XTR Exp3[e, b] = eb ∈
Fq, and sends eb to Alice.
3. Alice receives eb from Bob, computes XTR Exp3[eb, a] = eba, and determines K
based on eba = Tr(q6,q)(gba).
4. Bob uses XTR Exp3[ea, b] = eab, and determines K based on eab = Tr(q6,q)(gab).
5.2 Comparison to Original XTR
In this section, we compare XTR over characteristic three to the original XTR. Let
XTR and XTR3 denote the original XTR [7] and XTR over characteristic three re-
spectively.
XTR group Gp
XTR - XTR group Gp =<h> is a subgroup of Gq2−q+1, where h ∈ F∗q6 .
• p and q are prime, and q ≡ 2( mod 3).
XTR3 - XTR group Gp =<g> is a subgroup of Gq−√3q+1, where g ∈ F∗q6 .
• p is prime and q = 32k−1.
Note that suggested lengths to provide adequate levels of security are log2(q) ≈
170 and log2(p) ≈ 160.
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XTR Exponentiation
XTR - For given Tr(q6,q2)(h) and n ∈ Zp computing Tr(q6,q2)(hn) takes 8 log2(n)
multiplications in Fq.
• Fq2 has Type-I ONB over Fq.
XTR3 - For given Tr(q6,q)(g) and n ∈ Zp computing Tr(q6,q)(gn) takes 8 log2(n)+
6 · (blog2(2k−1)c +HW (2k−1)) + blog2(k−1)c +HW (k−1) + 4 multiplications
in Fq.
• Fq2 has Type-II ONB over Fq.
• Fq has Type-II ONB over F3.
Denote by P and Q the sizes of the prime p and q to be generated, respectively. To
achieve security at least equivalent to 1024-bit RSA, 6Q should be set to about 1024,
i.e., Q ≈ 170, and P can for instance be set at 160. In XTR3, k = 55 satisfies that
Fq has Type-II ONB over F3, and also the size of Q ,where k = 55, is about 170. In
the case when k = 55, the result of 6 · (blog2(2k−1)c+HW (2k−1))+ blog2(k−1)c+
HW (k−1) + 4 is at most 101. In general, the size of n is about 160-bit. Under these
conditions, Tr(q6,q)(gn) takes about 1359 multiplications in Fq, which is only about
6% increase compared to the cost of computation of Tr(q6,q2)(hn). If q is fixed, then
finding square root of −1 can be pre-computed. Then, the computational overhead is
only 1% compared to that of original XTR.
Communication Overhead The communication overhead of XTR-DH in XTR3 is
about half of XTR-DH proposed in [7] and one six of traditional implementations of
the Diffie-Hellman protocol that are based on subgroups of multiplicative groups of
finite fields, and that achieves the same level of security.
Size of Public Key Parameter In XTR, the public key data are q, p, and
Tr(q6,q2)(h). Thus, the total length is 3Q + P . However, in the case of XTR3, the
public key data are q(= 32k−1), p, and Tr(q6,q)(g), and the total length of it is 2Q+P .
If we select Q ≈ 170 and P ≈ 160 then the required length of public key data of XTR3
is reduced about 26% from that of XTR.
6 Side Channel Attacks
6.1 Improved XTR Single Exponentiation
(cf. [11], Algorithm 5.1)
XTR-ISE is based on an adaptation of a Euclidean algorithm by Montgomery using
Lucas chains. For ease of notation, we will momentarily use ordinary exponentiation
in our description instead of the third order XTR recurrence. Note that the following
description of XTR-ISE is based on Algorithm 3.1 without the optional steps and
Algorithm 5.1 in [11].
Improved XTR Single Exponentiation (XTR-ISE)
Input: c1 and n where n > 2
Output: cn
1. Initialization:
1.1. Let a =round( 3−
√
5
2 n) and b = n− a (where round(x) is the integer closest to x).
1.2. Let f = 0. As long as a and b are both even, replace (a, b) by (a/2, b/2) and f by f + 1.
1.3. Let i = 1 and Gi := (Q0, Q1, Q2, Q3) = (c1, c1, 3, c
p
1).
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2. As long as a 6= b
2.1. If b > a
X1. if b ≤ 4a, then (a, b)← (b− a, a)
T0 ← A[Q0, Q1, Q2, Q3], T1 ← Q0,
T2 ← Q1, T3 ← Qp2 .
X2. else if b is even, then (a, b)← (a, b/2)
T0 ← D[Q0], T1 ← Q1,
T2 ← A[Q0, Q2, Q1, Qp3 ], T3 ← D[Q2].
X3. else if a is odd, then (a, b)← (a, (b− a)/2)
T0 ← D[Q0], T1 ← A[Q0, Q1, Q2, Q3],
T2 ← Q2, T3 ← D[Q1]p.
X4. else (a is even), then (a, b)← (b, a/2)
T0 ← D[Q1], T1 ← Q0,
T2 ← Qp3 , T3 ← D[Q2]p.
2.2. Else (if a > b)
Y1. if a ≤ 4b, then (a, b)← (a− b, b)
T0 ← A[Q0, Q1, Q2, Q3], T1 ← Q1,
T2 ← Q0, T3 ← Q2.
Y2. else if a is even, then (a, b)← (b, a/2)
T0 ← D[Q1], T1 ← Q0,
T2 ← Qp3 , T3 ← D[Q2]p.
Y3. else if b is odd, then (a, b)← (b, (a− b)/2)
T0 ← D[Q1], T1 ← A[Q0, Q1, Q2, Q3],
T2 ← Qp2 , T3 ← D[Q0]p.
Y4. else (b is even), then (a, b)← (a, b/2)
T0 ← D[Q0], T1 ← Q1,
T2 ← A[Q0, Q2, Q1, Qp3 ], T3 ← D[Q2]
2.3. i← i+ 1 and set Gi = (T0, T1, T2, T3).
3. Compute c˜ = A[Q0, Q1, Q2, Q3] = cu+v.
4. Output c˜2f .
5. If a = 1 then return c˜2f
else run Improved XTR Single Exponentiation with c = c˜2f and n = a.
6.2 SPA-Resistant Trace Operations
From Lemma 1,
D[x] = x2 − 2xq = (R1, R2),
R1 = (x1 + x2) · (x1 − x2) + 2x1x2 − 2x2,
R2 = 2(x1+ x2) · (x1− x2) + 2x1x2 − 2x1.
A[x, z, y, w] = x · z − y · zq + w = (S1, S2),
S1 = (x2 + x1 + y2 − y1) · z1 + (x1 − x2 − y1 − y2) · z2 + w1,
S2 = (x2 − x1 − y1 − y2) · z1 + (x1 + x2 + y1 − y2) · z2 + w2.
In Table 2 we show how to make two applications ofD[·] indistinguishable from one
application of A[·]. We may assume that modular addition and modular subtraction
are indistinguishable if we represent an element a ∈ F3 as two bit-vectors aH and aL
constructed from a such that aH = a div 2 and aL = a mod 2. Given representation
of this type, subtraction can be implemented by the same function as addition since
the negation of an element a simply swaps the vectors aH and aL over.
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